Kargil-Fact Sheet 1

Ahsan Iqbal

The book is a megalomaniac account of Pakistan’s history according to which in fifty-nine years of nation’s history except for the leadership of General Musharaf and his seven years of rule nothing right happened. It is an account of self-praise and self-deception that makes belittles all past leaders and national institutions to make General Musharaf look taller. There are several aspects of the book, which relate to various aspects of our national life that require correction and explanation. PML-N will bring out series of fact sheets to present facts before the nation so that it may judge for itself what the truth is and that it is truth itself which has been the principal victim of this book.

Kargil – In Line of Fire

Kargil was one of the most controversial chapters of our national history. General Musharaf has admitted in his book that it was the major reason of his differences with elected PM Nawaz Sharif and usurping power. “The Kargil episode created the biggest divide between the Prime Minister and myself”. (Page 136)

The centerpiece of the controversy is whether the General undertook this adventure with some ulterior motives without the approval of the lawful government of the day or the operation was formally authorized by the PM, the competent authority in this case. General Musharaf has narrated this fact in the book in following words:

“One myth is that the operation was launched without the army’s taking the political leadership into confidence…The army briefed the PM in Skardu on January 29, 1999 and in Kel on February 5, 1999. During these briefings our defensive maneuver was explained as response to all that was happening on the Indian side. Subsequently, the PM was also briefed on March 12 at the Directorate general ISI which included a detailed survey on the situation inside occupied Jammu & Kashmir and also along the LOC. As the operation developed he was briefed in detail by the DGMO on May 17. Later briefings were also arranged on June 2 and June 22”. (Page 95-96)

According to his account, he gave the PM briefings on following occasions. But even a cursory look at his narration of facts will show the inaccuracies of the facts and the fallacies of the analysis. Let’s examine his account of briefings:
a) January 29, 1999 at Skardu
b) February 5, 1999 at Kel
c) March 12, 1999 at Directorate General, ISI
d) May 17, 1999 by Director General, Military Operations.
e) June 2 and 22, 1999.

As regards first two briefings, he states “During these briefings our defensive maneuver was explained as response to all that was happening on the Indian side”. How does Kargil Operation, which according to him involved occupying 800 sq kilometers (Page 91) across LOC fall within the ambit of defensive maneuver. The fact is that the briefing at Skardu was on tourism promotion in Northern Areas of Pakistan whereas the Kel briefing was to give approval on site for the Mansehra-Balakot-Kaghan-Batakundi-Kel road in which Kargil figured nowhere.

The third briefing according to his account was at Directorate General, ISI that was a survey of the situation inside occupied Jammu & Kashmir and also along the LOC. How can this be construed to be a briefing on Kargil adventure. The fourth briefing on May 17, 1999 is, according to him, the first briefing when he admits that PM was briefed in detail about the operation by DGMO. Even the junior most officers know that DGMO is the competent office to brief on any operational matter like Kargil. According to his version the briefing on May 17, 1999 was the first ever briefing by DGMO to the PM. Now let’s look at the chronology of events according to his narration in the book, which categorically demonstrate that action in Kargil theatre had started much earlier:

“A plan calling for plugging the gaps-ranging from 9 to 28 miles- between our positions was formally presented and approved towards the middle of January, 1999”. (Page 90)

It is more than evident that Kargil Operation was under execution in January, 1999.

“By the end of April the unoccupied gaps along 75 miles of the LOC had been secured by over 100 new posts of 10-20 persons each”. (Page 90)

By end of April over 100 posts had already been established committing up to two thousand troops.

“The first confrontation between the two armies took place on May 2, when Indian troops bumped into our position in Shyok sector. The second encounter took place with freedom fighters in the Battalik sector on May 7. (Page 90). “Another skirmish took place with the freedom fighters in Dras sector on May 10,1999”. (Page 91)

If there were Mujahideen controlling the heights, how General Musharaf justifies describing confrontation between armies which took place according to him on May 2,7, and 10, 1999. It is amply clear that when the war had broken out between armies of two nuclear states only then General Musharaf panicked and decided to brief the Prime Minister for soliciting his support. This briefing on May 17, 1999 was not complete either as it became evident later from the recorded conversations between General Musharraf and General Aziz on the May 26, 1999 and May 29, 1999, which came to light in the first week of June 1999. It was only then the PM came to know that our troops were involved in the Kargil conflict.

“On May 15, I ordered FCNA to improve our defensive positions in coordination with the freedom fighters to deny access to the water shed by India. By now the freedom fighters occupied over 800 sq kilometers of Indian occupied territory.” (Page 91)

It is ridiculous to assert that defensive positions were improved while nearly 800 sq kilometers territory across LOC was occupied. This refutes his earlier assertion that it was improving defensive positions and also Mujahideen were occupying the posts as he claims:

“The positions held by our troops on July 4 are shown in Map 3-Page 92” (Page 93)

The map 3 shows that our troops were deployed across the LOC.

“The briefing given by me personally to the Defence Committee of the cabinet on July 2, 1999 actually laid out the entire military picture…That the Indians were in no position to launch an all out offensive on land, sea, and the air…That the Indians forces despite their massive strength, would never be able to dislodge the freedom fighters and NLI from the ingresses and positions held by them” (Page 96)

He clearly admits that the first comprehensive military picture of the operation was presented to the civilian leadership through Defence Committee on July 2, 1999 when in reality pressure had started mounting in the war zone with high casualities. This became evident later from the fall of Tiger Hill, the most strategic and fortified position, on July 4, 1999. Imagine the assessment of General Musharaf assuring the PM that India is not in a position to launch an all out offensive on land sea and the air after losing 800 sq kilometers of land showing that they learnt no lesson from Operation Gibralter, preceding September, 1965 war when GHQ had made similar plan and assessments. An average student of military history without attending any staff course and studying Klausweitz and Liddlehart can understand that an aspiring regional power with nuclear arsenal in election year will not pocket the insult of losing 800 sq kilometers under its control without fully stretching its military muscles on international borders. This narration also shows how General Musharaf was guilty of giving wrong assessment of the ground situation, which was markedly different from what he was presenting before the Defence Committee of the Cabinet as the later events would prove.

“At the briefing (July 2, 1999) the Prime Minister asked me several times whether we should accept a ceasefire and withdraw…Chaudhary Shujaat Hussain, the Interior Minister at that time,…said that whatever we did, we must stress that Kargil was “our joint effort and collective responsibility” (Page 97)

Even the trusted friend and saviour of General Musharaf, Ch Shujaat concedes here that General Musharaf had acted unilaterally without taking into confidence the elected government. When the PM showed his annoyance he tried to calm the situation by suggesting “Meetti Pao”. In the words “whatever we did, we must stress that Kargil was our joint effort” and suggesting that now the PM should bail out the military leadership by assuming collective responsibility it is abundantly clear that there was dissent. It was in the spirit of national interest and defending the honour of the national institution, that then the PM undertook initiatives to find a suitable exit strategy while there were calls to take disciplinary action against General Musharaf from within his Parliamentary Party.

“The other commanders were informed immediately on the unreasonably escalated Indian response…The foregoing should also explain why the naval and Air Force chiefs were ignorant about it until the Indian response bordered on war hysteria”. (Page 97)

It clearly shows lack of appreciation and imagination on the part of general Musharaf who saw no role for Corp Commanders and other forces in the operation but soon was desperately seeking support of air force to withstand the onslaught of Indian air force in Kargil. It was also too naïve on his part to rule out the possibility of this conflict escalating to a full scale war, which events proved was a near possibility, in which case our two main forces were neither in knowledge of nor prepared for such an emergency. Any strike by Indian Air Force and navy could have caught us totally by surprise like it happened on 6 September, 1965 at Lahore front.

“International pressure had a demoralizing effect on PM Nawaz Sharif” (Page 93)

It is absurd and a joke to allege that a Prime Minister who didn’t succumb to international pressure at the time of nuclear detonations in May, 1998 would now come under international pressure. It was not demoralizing effect of international pressure but thanks to General Musharaf, Pakistan faced isolation and was not finding the required international support even from its closest friends for this misadventure. The anxiety of the international community was understandable as two one of the largest armies of the world, with demonstrated nuclear capability, were eye ball to eye ball in Kargil. This fact was admitted by Lt General Asad Durrani in a recent TV talk show.

“I can also say with authority that in 1999 our nuclear capability was not yet operational”. (Page 97-98)

In any country with rule of law, any senior member of the security making such an irresponsible statement would face court martial and treason charges. What more can be said as it is universally believed that ambiguity is one of the fundamental pillars of the nuclear doctrine. This statement is factually incorrect as former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and former Army Chief General Aslam Baig have rebutted this in their recent statements and have asserted that Pakistan’s nuclear capability was operational much before General Musharaf became Army Chief.

“I went with all my family and some friends to the hill resort of Murree to relax over the weekend. At about 9 pm on Saturday, July 3, I received an urgent call from the prime Minister informing me to my consternation that he was flying to the US and that I should meet him at Islamabad airport immediately”. (Page 97)

It is unfortunate to note that while our soldiers were being subjected to ruthless and incessant bombing by India in Kargil, their Commander had time for relaxation in the company of family and friends at a hill resort just one day before the fall of Tiger Hill on July 4,1999. It reminds us of Neru of Rome. It is most shameful that General Musharaf has conveniently distorted the facts of Prime Minister’s visit to US and suggested to the readers that he came to know about it on July 3, 1999 when the PM called him. Here is an account of the events as narrated by his “close” friend General (Retd) Anthony Zinni of the United States Marine Corps in his book Battle Ready who has testified to this fact. Here is what the American General has written about the withdrawal from Kargil: “I was directed by the Administration to head a presidential mission to Pakistan to convince Prime Minister Sharif and General Musharraf to withdraw their forces from Kargil. I met the Pakistani leadership in Islamabad on June 24 and 25 and put forth a simple rationale for withdrawing: If you don’t pull back, you’re going to bring war and nuclear annihilation down on your country. That’s going to be very bad news for everybody. Nobody actually quarreled with this rationale. The problem for the Pakistani leadership was the apparent loss of face. Backing down and pulling back to the Line of Control looked like political suicide. We needed to come up with a face-saving way out of this mess. What we were able to offer was a meeting with President Clinton, which would end the isolation that had long been the state of affairs between our two countries, but we would announce the meeting only after a withdrawal of forces. That got Musharraf’s attention; and he encouraged Prime Minister Sharif to hear me out. Sharif was reluctant to withdraw before the meeting with Clinton was announced (again, his problem was maintaining face)…We set up a meeting with Clinton in July”.

This is General Musharraf’s friend, whom he calls Tony by his first name, testifying to the fact that it was General Musharraf who sought the withdrawal and the PM was reluctant as the honour of his army was at stake. On June 27, 1999 General Musharraf told the Pakistani press that the Kargil conflict would be discussed in the meeting between President Clinton and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. This was the first time any one had announced the PM was to meet President Clinton. General Zinni clearly writes that nobody quarreled with his argument that if Pakistan didn’t withdraw troops it will bring full war to the country. When General Musharaf didn’t challenge General Zinni’s assessment of the possibility of full scale war how could he present the analysis that there was no chance of India attacking Pakistan a few days later to the Defence Cabinet Committee on July 2, 1999, if he did then he was certainly misleading.

“I would like to state emphatically that whatever movement has taken place so far in the direction of finding the solution to Kashmir is due considerably to Kargil conflict”. (Page 98)

The fact of the matter is that this misadventure resulted into irreparable loss to the Kashmir cause on the following facts:
a) We were isolated on Kashmir issue.
b) Kashmir freedom struggle got linked with cross border terrorism issue, which General Musharaf himself conceded in Islamabad Declaration signed with PM Vajpayee making a promise to not to allow cross border terrorism either from Pakistan or any territory under control of Pakistan and accepted it to be a bilateral matter.
c) It sabotaged the honourable peace process between India and Pakistan set in motion by PM Nawaz Sharif in Feb 1999 resulting in Lahore declaration.
d) General Musharaf abandoned the historic position of Pakistan on Kashmir in respect of UN resolutions on plebiscite.
e) He has given unilateral concessions in the name of CBMs without getting anything in quid pro quo.
f) LOC has been allowed to be fenced changing its character.

“I am ashamed to say, our political leadership insinuated that the achievements of our troops amounted to a “debacle”.” (Page 95)

General Musharaf blames political leadership of insinuation while several senior retired military generals have pointed out to this effect that this operation was politically unsustainable, ill-conceived, and the worst debacle. According to Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, during East Pakistan war we still had some friends but in Kargil we were left friendless. It was a disaster bigger than East Pakistan tragedy(Oct 3, 2006)

It is abundantly clear from the above that General Musharaf falsified and concocted the facts to serve his personal interests at the cost of national interest. Not to speak of his violation of his constitutional oath prohibiting divulging any sensitive information which he comes to know during discharge of his office. Therefore, it is imperative to appoint an independent, neutral, and trustworthy national commission consisting of retired Judges of Supreme Court, eminent experts, and members from civil society to thoroughly probe into the Kargil Operation to fix the liability of all the actors involved leading to due process of Law so that history doesn’t repeat itself.

Ahsan Iqbal is Secretary Information, PML-N